Abstract: The presidential approval rate among a president's co-partisans has received a great deal of attention and is an important quantity for understanding accountability of the executive branch. We show that the reported composition of the president's party is endogenous to presidential popularity, with the party growing and becoming more ideologically moderate as presidential popularity increases. As a result, observed partisan approval rates may be biased due to compositional change in respondents who self-identify with the president's party. We derive bounds on the compositionally-corrected partisan approval rate under a theoretically-motivated monotonicity condition. We examine how the bounds have evolved during the Obama and Trump presidencies. The proportion of survey respondents who identify with the Republican party has decreased rapidly from the pre-election benchmark during the Trump presidency and, as a result, the lower bound on Trump's partisan approval rate is much lower than at a comparable point in the Obama presidency.
In this short paper, we examine how compositional changes in public opinion polls a↵ect estimation of the presidential approval rate among a president's co-partisans and employ Manski-style (2007) bounds to correct for these compositional changes. We document that the composition of self-reported partisans changes in response to the president's popularity.
As a result, observed partisan approval rates may be biased due to changes in the composition of survey respondents who self-identify with the president's party. We show that the proportion of the president's co-partisans in a survey sample relative to a benchmark level is an essential (and typically ignored) component in bounding the partisan approval rate. By accounting for changes in the proportion of president co-partisans in a survey sample relative to an electorally-important benchmark level, we demonstrate that partisan approval may be meaningfully lower than observed when fewer respondents report presidential co-partisanship or higher than observed when more respondents report presidential co-partisanship.
The partisan presidential approval rate has received a great deal of popular attention recently with many observers of American politics commenting on the high approval rate that President Trump enjoys among self-identified Republicans even while his aggregate approval rate is low by historic standards (Shepard 2017) . Commentators have also noted that the partisan approval rate has implications for governance (Dropp and Nyhan 2017) . High presidential partisan approval rates may insulate the president from electoral and legislative accountability. Because committee chairs set the ground rules for investigations into the executive branch (Kriner and Schickler 2014) , the presidential partisan approval rate is especially important under unified government when the president's party holds majorities in the House and Senate. Committee chairs may condition their willingness to hold the executive branch accountable for its actions on the president's approval rate among legislators' partisan electorate. More broadly, co-partisans of the president seek to represent the views of partisan constituents either due to electoral or normative concerns regarding representation and these e↵orts have implications for the success or failure of a president's legislative agenda (Canes-Wrone and De Marchi 2002) .
In cross-sectional surveys, estimating outcomes in the sample of respondents with a particular self-reported characteristic can result in a misleading estimate when self-reported characteristics are endogenous to external developments.
1 This endogeneity may be the result of respondents either declining to complete the survey when they are unsatisfied with the president's performance (Gelman et al. 2016; Hartman 2018) or changing their self-reported partisanship in response to their assessment of the president's performance. These possibilities are particularly important in the context of the presidential partisan approval rate. In
Online Appendix B, we provide evidence that the probability that an individual respondent identifies with the president's party increases with presidential approval, but that the probability an individual identifies with the president's ideology is unresponsive to presidential
approval. As we demonstrate, when presidents are losing support, the naive partisan approval rate can overestimate the approval rate among presidential co-partisans because some prior weak partisans no longer identify with the president's party. Similarly, when presidential approval is high non-partisans' probability of identifying with the president's party increases so the rate of non-partisans' approval may be underestimated.
We show how the observed partisan approval rate can mislead when the sample composition changes over time and we construct Manski-style bounds for the compositionallycorrected partisan approval rate. We show that under a theoretically-motivated monotonicity 1 Polls such as the RAND American Life Panel (Gutsche et al. 2014 ) employ high-frequency panels that allow researchers to examine how survey responses change among the same class of individuals over time. While these panels allow researchers to correct for compositional change by examining the outcome of interest for the same individuals over time, we focus on bounding outcomes under compositional change with cross-sectional polls, such as Gallup's presidential approval poll, because of their widespread use and the vast amount of popular attention that they receive. Moreover, even panel surveys are subject to attrition and nonresponse bias that may necessitate compositional correction and in some settings, such as historical studies, panels may not exist.
condition, the true compositionally-corrected partisan approval rate must lie within easilycalculable bounds. The bounds crucially depend on the proportion of survey respondents who identify with the president's party relative to a benchmark proportion. The upper bound is calculated by assuming that all missing (resp. excess) partisans approve (resp. disapprove) of the president while the lower bound assumes that the missing (resp. excess) partisans disapprove (resp. approve) of the president. These results emphasize the importance of accounting for the proportion of respondents in the president's party when interpreting observed partisan approval rates. We conclude by examining how the bounds have evolved over Obama and Trump presidencies. The proportion of survey respondents who identify with the Republican party has decreased rapidly from the pre-election benchmark during the Trump presidency and, as a result, the lower bound on Trump's partisan approval rate is much lower than at a comparable point in the Obama presidency.
We make a methodological contribution to the study of compositional change in public opinion polls and has important implications for empirical studies that employ observed partisan approval rates as the dependent variable. Gelman et al. (2016) correct for endogenous survey response rates by using multi-level regression with poststratification where the poststratification is performed with information on respondents' partisanship and political characteristics, in addition to standard demographic variables. Our approach is a complementary method to account for changes in the composition of a survey, but instead of point identifying the compositionally-corrected outcome using an ignorability assumption on selection in the survey we derive bounds on this quantity under theoretically-motivated monotonicity conditions.
Other work in political science has employed Manski (2007) bounds for the purpose of set identifying a quantity of interest. Ashworth et al. (2008) 
Bounding Compositionally-Corrected Partisan Approval Rates
To derive our empirical bounds on the the partisan approval rate, we model poll respondents as being drawn from a finite set of types 2 and make one behavioral assumption about the likelihood of identifying as a party member, which we call the stable alignment assumption.
We assume that as one type of respondent becomes more likely to identify as a presidential co-partisan then all types are weakly more likely to identify as presidential co-partisans.
We make no other assumptions about the likelihood of approving of the president or the relationship between identity as a co-partisan and approval. In Online Appendix A, we show that under the stable alignment assumption the compositionally-corrected partisan approval rate that we define must lie within the bounds in expectation.
3
We define our bounds under two di↵erent empirical conditions: when there is a surplus of presidential co-partisans and when there is a deficit relative to a benchmark proportion. Let P be the proportion of respondents that report presidential co-partisanship in the benchmark. 4 Let T be the total number of respondents in the survey and let P be the 2 These types characterize the probability that a member identifies with the president's party and approves of the president. The types could represent demographic or attitudinal groups. The exact definition of types is not essential for deriving the bounds.
3 In the section "Relaxing the Monotonicity Condition", we discuss how potential violations of the stable alignment assumption would make the bounds less informative.
4 In our application, we use the proportion reporting co-partisanship with the presidential number reporting presidential co-partisanship. Each respondent reports either approval or disapproval.
5 Let the number of presidential co-partisans who report approval be P A . The observed partisan approval that does not account for compositional changes is simply
< P , then the proportion reporting presidential co-partisanship is lower in the survey than in the benchmark and we say that a deficit of presidential co-partisans is equal to T ⇤ P P respondents. To calculate the upper bound of compositionally stable partisan presidential approval, we account for the deficit of missing presidential co-partisans by assuming that each "missing" co-partisan approves so we add to both the numerator (number of approvers) and the denominator (number of presidential co-partisans) arriving
To derive the lower bound, we assume that each missing presidential co-partisan does not approve and only add to the denominator so that the copartisan approval rate is
> P , then the proportion reporting presidential co-partisanship is higher in the survey than in the benchmark and we say that we have a surplus of presidential co-partisans equal to P T ⇤ P respondents. To calculate the upper bound of compositionally stable partisan presidential approval, we account for the surplus of presidential co-partisans by assuming that each "extra" co-partisan disapproves and so while we adjust the denominator down, we do not adjust the numerator down, arriving at
To derive the lower bound, we assume that each extra co-partisan does approve, and we adjust both the numerator and the denominator down, so that the co-partisan approval rate is
We have defined our bounds in the simplest possible context, but the procedure can be extended to accommodate more complex situations such as survey weights and question winner in the last available pre-election poll, but the analyst could employ any proportion.
5 In our base case, we remove respondents who do not answer the approval question. 6 We further account for the fact that there may not be a su cient number of missing or excess co-partisan of a specific type in a poll to add or remove. In practice these modifications rarely hold.
non-response. Additional theoretical restrictions can also be applied to tighten the bounds.
Evolution of the Bounds During Obama and Trump Presidencies
We apply our bounding procedure to examine how the compositionally-corrected partisan approval rate has evolved over the course of the Obama and Trump presidencies using presidential approval polls from Gallup Analytics. Gallup Analytics reports cross-tabs for presidential approval by partisanship and the number of respondents identifying as Democrats, Republicans, and Independents every week. 7 We use all available presidential approval data from 2009-2017 for the analysis.
8
We calculate the partisanship deficit or surplus relative to the partisanship proportions in the last poll available before the previous election. We believe that the last pre-election poll is the best measure of the electorally-relevant coalition size, but our approach is flexible enough to employ alternative benchmarks in di↵erent contexts. 9 We use unweighted partisanship proportions because Gallup Analytics reports the count of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents in the sample as opposed to a weighted quantity. To calculate standard errors, we bootstrap the upper and lower bound by computing the standard deviation of the upper and lower bounds across 200 bootstrap replications.
10
7 The cross-tabs exclude partisan leaners from the two major parties and because we lack access to the underlying individual-level survey responses we cannot recreate partisanship proportions that include leaners.
In Figure 1 , we plot the partisan deficit relative to the pre-election baseline partisanship proportions against the number of days since the inauguration for the two terms of the In Figure 2 , we plot observed partisan approval rates, the bounds on the compositionallycorrected partisan approval rate, and 95 percent confidence intervals for the upper and lower bound during the first 346 days of each presidential term. 12 The marker is the observed partisan approval rate, the first dark capped line extending out from the marker are the and 450 approve of the president and 550 disapprove, the pseudo-individual data for the independents consists of 1,000 observations with 450 observations set equal to 1 for approval and 550 observations with 0s for the approval variable.
11 Consistent with our findings in Online Appendix B, there is a negative relationship between presidential approval and the magnitude of the partisan deficit in the Gallup Analytics sample. The correlation is -0.5665 and in a regression with robust standard errors of the president's partisan deficit on presidential approval the coe cient estimate is -0.176 and the t-statistic is a highly significant -15.28. The results are similar if we use presidential approval from the previous week as the independent variable.
12 The final poll from our sample is 346 days after Trump's inauguration so we restrict attention to this timespan in order to ease visual comparison. In Figure C .1 of the Online Appendix, we report a graph that shows the entire history of the observed partisan approval bounds, and the second lighter capped lines are the 95 percent confidence intervals on the lower and upper bounds.
13
Trump's observed partisan approval rates are very low compared to the same period during Obama's first term, but are roughly comparable to Obama's second term. More relevant for our analysis is how the bounds evolve over time. The lower bound on the compositionally-corrected partisan approval rate is quite low during Trump's presidency.
In 40 of the 49 weeks, the lower bound is below 0.8. In all instances, the lower bound on Trump's compositionally-corrected partisan approval rate is lower than the lower bound from the analogous poll during Obama's first term.
14 The observed partisan approval rate is partially an artifact of missing respondents who would have previously reported Republican partisanship. While Trump's observed partisan approval rate has received much attention, the data are also consistent with the possibility that his partisan approval rate is quite low relative to recent presidential history.
Conclusion
We have shown that self-reported partisanship is endogenous to presidential approval in Gallup polls and derived bounds on the compositionally-corrected partisan approval rate under a relatively mild and theoretically-justified monotonicity condition. We also documented how the bounds on the compositionally-corrected partisan approval rate have evolved over
Obama's presidency and Trump's first seven months in o ce. The lower bounds on the compositionally-corrected partisan approval rates are much lower than at equivalent points in Obama's first and second terms. While we have framed our discussion in terms of endogerates, bounds, and confidence intervals over the complete 2009-2017 period.
13 In some instances, the standard errors are so small that the confidence intervals are visually indistinguishable from the point estimate for the bounds.
14 Moreover, the mean lower bound on the partisan approval rate during the first 49 weeks of Obama's first term is approximately 0.886 compared to 0.755 during the Trump presidency.
Even in Obama's second term, the mean lower bound during the first 49 weeks is 0.832. 
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McCrain is a PhD student at Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322. In this appendix, we define our quantify of interest and establish that it is contained in our empirical identification region. Let each respondent be represented by a type ⌧ 2 {1, 2, 3...⌧ }.
We assume that each respondent type has a propensity for identifying with the party of the president that depends on a underlying state of the world ! 2 ⌦ ✓ R and denote this propensity by ⇢(⌧, !) and note that it lies in [0, 1]. We label states of the world, such that a higher ! is associated with higher probabilities of reporting presidential co-partisanship (PCP) for all respondent types. Factors that could a↵ect ! include incumbent performance, media coverage, the performance of the economy, elections, or world events. Our key assumption is that, conditional on our labeling of states of the world, that higher states of the world are associated with a weakly higher probability of reporting PCP for all respondent types. Substantively, this assumption rules out states associated with a wholesale realignment of the political environment where, for example, those who formerly self-reported as Republican become less likely to report being Republican while those that previously identified as Democrats become more likely to identify as Republican. While such a realignment may occur over time, we limit our analysis to a single presidential term following an election where we believe the assumption is likely to hold. In any case, any method that seeks to account for compositional change would need to make a similar assumption in addition to stronger, less theoretically-motivated assumptions.
We call this assumption the Stable Assignment Assumption and state it formally:
In addition to a probability of aligning with the president's party each respondent has a propensity for reporting approval of the president that can vary with their type or the state of the world: ↵(⌧, !) 2 [0, 1]. We allow this probability to vary arbitrarily with respondent type and state and allow for any cross-dependence between state and type.
In what follows, we abstract away from sampling variation that might change the distribution of types in the survey. For simplicity of presentation, we assume that the distribution of types is fixed and equal to p(⌧ ) where p(⌧ ) 0 for all ⌧ 2 1, 2, 3...⌧ and
Sample variability is a well studied issue and we follow Manski (2007) by bootstrapping standard errors for all our empirical analogues by recalculating the bounds for each bootstrap replication and computing the standard deviation across the bootstrap replications.
We can now calculate the proportion of respondents who report PCP and the approval rate among those reporting PCP. Let P(!) be the proportion of respondents reporting PCP when the state is !. Formally:
Of particular interest is the set of respondents that report PCP at a benchmark point in time. Let the state during the election be ! 0 and call those that report PCP in state ! 0 core supporters. The proportion of core supporters is a fixed quantity of interest and is equal to P(! 0 ) and the probability that a respondent of type ⌧ is a core supporter is ⇢(⌧, ! 0 ).
In addition to the proportion of respondents that report PCP, we can calculate the average level of support among those that report PCP. Let r(⌧, !) =
be the probability mass function for those that report PCP given ! and let IS(!) be the average approval rate among them. Formally:
While IS(!) is observable in surveys, it is subject to change for two distinct reasons.
First, it may change as the rate of approval for each type ⌧ changes. Second, it may change due to compositional changes as the rate of PCP changes. We are interested in changes in approval that only reflected changes in the state and not changes in partisan composition. To account for the compositional changes, we define our quantity of interest, CS(!), to be the average level of support among core supporters, the group where the probability of reporting PCP is fixed at the level for state ! 0 . Formally:
To see the relationship between our quantity of interest CS(!) and the observable IS(!),
we introduce some more notation. Let (⌧, !) = |⇢(⌧, !) ⇢(⌧, ! 0 )| be the absolute di↵erence between the probability that a person reports PCP in state ! and the probability that a person reports PCP in in state ! 0 . Given our Stable Alignment Assumption, (⌧, !) = 
be the probability mass function for the additional PCP respondents given ! and let DS(!) be average approval among these additional supporters. Formally:
We can now decompose IS(!) into a mixture of core supporter approval and additional supporter approval:
Re-arranging, we can express our quantity of interest, CS(!) in terms of observable quantities, IS(!), P(!), P(! 0 ), and (!) and an unknown, but bounded quantity, DS(!):
Simple algebra gives us:
While we cannot observe the approval rate among the excess respondents that report PCP, we know that their approval rate is bounded between 0 and 1, thus we can construct a theoretical upper bound CS surplus (!) by assuming that each additional PCP identifier does not approve and construct a theoretical lower bound CS surplus (!) by assuming each additional PCP identifier does approve:
and so we arrive at our main proposition for the case where there is a surplus (relative to the election) of respondents that report PCP.
Case II: ! < ! 0
We now consider the case where ! < ! 0 , so that (!) = P(! 0 ) P(!) and (⌧, !) = ⇢(⌧, ! 0 ) ⇢(⌧, !). The set of core supporters includes all those that report PCP, but additionally contains respondents that do not report PCP. Now, DS(!) defined above, is the average approval among these missing core supporters.
We can decompose our quantity of interest, CS(!), into a mixture of the observable approval rate among those that report PCP, IS(!), the observable weights P(!), P(! 0 ), and (!) and the unknown, but bounded quantity, DS(!), which is the approval rate among missing core supporters:
While we cannot observe the approval rate among the missing core supporters, we know that their approval rate is bounded between 0 and 1, thus we can construct a theoretical upper bound CS def icit (!) by assuming that each additional missing core supporter does approve and construct a theoretical lower bound CS def icit (!) by assuming each additional missing core supporter does not approve:
and so we arrive at our second main proposition.
Proposition 2. Under the stable alignment assumption, if
To transition between our theoretical bounds and our empirical bounds, we describe our empirical analogues. Our empirical measure of the proportion of core supporters, P(! 0 ), is the percentage of respondents reporting being partisans with the party of the eventual winner of the presidential election in a benchmark period. Our empirical measure of the proportion of respondents reporting PCP in any given poll, P(!), is the percentage of respondents reporting presidential co-partisanship. Finally, our empirical measure of PCP respondent support, IS(!), is simply the approval rate among those reporting partisanship with the president. Which set of bounds we use depends on whether ! is greater or less than ! 0 .
Under the stable alignment assumption, ! > ! 0 if and only P(!) > P(! 0 ) or empirically when the proportion of strong presidential partisans is greater than in the pre-election poll.
Thus, when the proportion of strong presidential partisans is greater than in the pre-election poll, we apply the bounds from proposition 1 otherwise we apply the bounds from proposition
2.
An alternative and theoretically complementary explanation for changes in the composition of partisanship in surveys is that the changes are driven not by di↵ering responses to the partisanship question, but instead are driven by di↵ering response rates by partisans. In such a setting, the response to the partisan ID question would not vary with the state, but instead the composition of types in a survey would vary by survey. In particular, let T be the set of types and let R be set of types that report co-partisanship with the president and let D be the set of types that do not report PCP. Formally, T = D [ R where D \ R = ;. As the partisanship response is unchanging, let ⇢(⌧, !) = 0 for all ⌧ 2 D and for all ! 2 ⌦ and let ⇢(⌧, !) = 1 for all ⌧ 2 R and for all ! 2 ⌦. As before, the answer to the approval question can vary in any way with the state, but we instead assume that the probability of responding to the survey can vary with the state. Let rr(⌧, !) be the response rate of a type ⌧ in state !. In this environment, our required monotonicity condition is that the rate of response varies monotonically with the state within a party. In particular, we would need to assume that there exists an ordering of states such if for some
In words, the assumption is that if a certain type of presidential co-partisan becomes more likely to respond to a survey than no type of co-partisan can be-come less likely to respond to a survey. Note that we are talking about rates of responding to a survey and allow for the magnitude of the change in response rates to vary across types and to di↵er across parties. In such an environment, it is relatively straightforward to show that a similar analysis as above holds and that the true level of PCP approval calculated at a benchmark response rate must lie within our bounds.
Relaxing the Monotonicity Condition
In this section, we outline the logic of what happens if the Stable Alignment Assumption (SAA) is violated. In short, as a reduction in core supporters reporting PCP is compensated by increase in non-core supporters reporting PCP, the bounds on the approval rate for core supporters become less informative. Eventually, as the proportion of core supporters in the set of PCP reporters goes to 0, the bounds become completely uninformative-that is the true approval rate of core supporters could be any value between 0 and 1. Importantly, a violation of the SAA also makes the interpretation of the bounds less meaningful. If politics are entering a period of realignment where previously Republican respondents become less likely to report being Republican while previously Democratic respondents become more likely to report being Republican, then it is not clear that the approval rate among "core" supporters as measured by the pre-realignment politics is substantively interesting.
In order to present a clear intuition, we adapt our original model by assuming that rather than each type having a probability of reporting PCP in each state, they either report PCP for sure (⇢(⌧, !) = 1) or they do not(⇢(⌧, !) = 0.) That is, we assume that ⇢(⌧, !) 2 {0, 1}.
Let S(!) = {⌧ 2 T : ⇢(⌧, !) = 1} be the set of types that report PCP in state !. In slight abuse of notation, we also define the following categories. Let P(Core) = P(! 0 ) that is the proportion of people reporting PCP in state ! 0 . Let P(S(!)) = P(!) be the proportion of people reporting PCP in any given state. Previously, under the SAA, if P(Core) > P(S(!))
then we knew that we had a deficit of supporters and that those that reported PCP in state ! would report PCP in state ! 0 . However, without SAA, the set S(!) contains both those that would and would not report PCP in state ! 0 . Let S c (!) = {⌧ 2 S(!) : rho(⌧, ! 0 ) = 1} be the set of those that report PCP in both state ! and ! 0 and let S nc (!) = S(!) \ S c (!) be the set of those that report PCP in ! but not !. Following above, let IS c (!) and IS c (!) be the (unobserved) approval rate of those in sets S c (!) and S nc (!) respectively. Similarly, let the proportion of repondents in each set be P(S c (!)) and P(S nc (!))
We now decompose the observed approval rate among those that report PCP in state ! into a mixture of the unobserved approval rates of core and non-core supporters:
Re-arranging equation 1, we can express the unobserved approval rate of core supporters that continue to report PCP in terms of the observable approval rate among those that report PCP (IS(!)) and the unobservable approval of non-core PCP reporters (IS nc (!)):
To get an upper bound for IS c (!), we assume that all approval is generated by core supporters and all non-core respondents reporting PCP do not approve. Taking into account the maximum logical value, we arrive at the bound:
To get a lower bound for IS c (!), we assume that all non-core reporters of PCP do approve. Taking into account the minimum logical value, we arrive at the bound:
Note that IS(!) is contained in the range [IS c (!), IS c (!)] and generically it is strictly contained in this range if the SAA does not hold. This points to one source of the increase in the bounds namely that we are getting a less precise measure of the core supporters that report PCP. Further, as degree of realignment increases and P(S c (!)) ! 0 and P(S c (!)) ! P(S(!)), the bounds on IS c (!) become uninformative. As we do not observe P(S c (!)) and P(S nc (!)) empirically in standard data, it is impossible to implement these bounds and so they exist as a theoretical exercise. In principle it may be feasible to measure the number the relative portion of each group in a panel setting, but if panel data exist there is not need to formally bound the quantities as they can directly estimated.
To generate bounds for all core supporters, not just those reporting PCP, we define b (!)
to the proportion of respondents that are core supporters, but do not report PCP, that iŝ (!) = P(core) P(S c (!)). Note that b (!) is greater that (!), the proportion of core supporters that do not report PCP under the SAA, as we learn the approval rating of few core supporters, a second reason why the bounds without SAA are less informative.
We can now define bounds on the core supporter approval rate in a manner exactly analogous to before taking into account that approval rate of core supporters that report PCP is now bounded:
Not that CS ¬SAA (!) CS(!) CS CS ¬SAA and that as P(S c (!)) ! 0, CS ¬SAA (!) ! 1 and CS ¬SAA (!) ! 0. Thus as the degree of realignment increases the theoretical bounds on core partisan support become uninformative.
Online Appendix B: Evidence of Endogenous Partisanship
We begin by presenting evidence that the composition of the president's party is endogenous to presidential popularity using monthly Gallup polls from the Roper Center archives. We employ the first poll of the month from January 2000 -June 2015, when the last Gallup poll in the Roper archive is reported, for our analysis. Gallup polls may be especially sensitive to the problem of endogenous partisanship due to question ordering e↵ects. Typically, the presidential approval question is the very first substantive 1 question in the survey (Sigelman 1981) and in all of the codebooks that we have reviewed this question is asked before the partisanship question.
2
To investigate these possibilities, we estimate linear probability models of the individual probability of identifying with the president's party and ideology 3 regressed on the previous month's average presidential approval rate 4 with each respondent weighted by the survey weight. The upper panel of Figure B .1 reports the predicted probability of identifying as a member of the president's party and ideology as a function of the previous month's presidential approval. The probability that a respondent identifies with the president's party is increasing with previous month's presidential approval while the ideology identification probability exhibits a much flatter relationship. 2 Randomizing partisanship and approval question ordering is a promising avenue for quantifying the extent to which the endogeneity we document is an artifact of question ordering.
3 We include individuals who lean toward the president's party as identifying with the president's party and in the case of a Democratic (Republican) president, we classify both strong and weak liberals (conservatives) as identifying with the president's ideology.
4 These data are from the American Presidency Project (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/popularity.php).
5 The coe cient estimates are statistically distinguishable from 0 in the partisanship re-
The coe cient estimate on the regression of presidential party response on previous month presidential approval is approximately 0.17. Over the entire range of observed presidential approval, the probability that a respondent identifies with the president's party increases from a low of 0.411 to a high of 0.515. In the sample, the standard deviation of monthly presidential approval is 0.1219 so a one-standard deviation increase in presidential approval increases the probability of identifying with the president's party by approximately 0.021.
In contrast, a one-standard deviation increase in presidential approval decreases the probability of identifying with the president's ideology by merely 0.006. These findings illustrate that self-reported partisanship is endogenous to the president's performance in o ce and that the pattern is not the result of citizens changing their political ideology in response to presidential performance. 6 As we discuss in the main text, these e↵ects may occur either because respondents' probability of completing the survey or self-reported partisanship changes in response to their assessment of the president's performance. We suspect that both mechanisms are driving the observed patterns in the data and are agnostic on the relative magnitudes of these two mechanisms. However, the result that the ideological composition of the survey does not change as dramatically as the partisan composition does suggest that at least some of the relationship is driven by survey respondents' changing their answer to the partisanship question. Properly quantifying the relative magnitudes of the two mechanisms could be accomplished with more information from survey organizations on the responses rates in their polls and is an important area for future research.
We next examine how the self-reported ideology of members of the president's party changes with presidential approval. 7 Under endogenous partisanship, we would expect that gressions, but not in the ideology regressions.
6 The vast literature showing that partisan attachments are durable, e.g. Green and Palmquist (1990) , also suggests that the observed compositional changes are likely to be a survey artifact as opposed to a real change in national partisanship in response to recent presidential performance. 
Strong President Ideology
Weak President Ideology Moderate Ideology Weak Opp. Pres. Ideology Strong Opp. Pres. Ideology unpopular presidents' parties are mostly made up of the ideologically extreme. As the opments and survey question e↵ects, but our finding that the probability of identifying with the president's ideology does not respond to presidential approval reduces concern about the most serious potential endogeneity problem. president becomes more popular, moderates and even ideological opponents begin to selfreport as members of the president's party.
The lower panel of Figure B .1 reveals how the ideological composition of the president's party evolves in response to presidential approval. Consistent with our expectations, individuals who strongly and weakly agree with the president's ideology become a smaller proportion of the president's party as the president becomes more popular. The largest estimated e↵ect is the increase in the share of moderates in the president's party. The share of respondents with weakly opposing ideology in the president's party also increases, but the magnitude of this relationship is smaller than the moderate share relationship. The flat line revealing the change in the share of individuals with strongly opposed ideology shows that these ideologically opposite individuals are unlikely to be converted to presidential partisans even when the president is extremely popular.
We also show that the results on the endogenous partisan composition hold when including individual-level demographics, 8 interacting these demographics with an indicator for a Democratic president, and only using within-president changes in presidential approval through the inclusion of president-specific fixed e↵ects. We account for the temporal dynamics of the data by aggregating the individual-level responses to one poll-level observation using a first-di↵erenced dependent variable with one autoregressive and one moving average component in an ARIMA model. We also examine the sensitivity of the results to the use of unweighted regressions. The results are quite similar across these specifications. 8 We include indicators for state of residence and whether the respondent is female, African-American, Asian, Latino, multi-racial, Native American, Native Hawaiian, or white, has a high school degree or less, some college, college degree, or post graduate degree, is in the 18-34, 35-54, or 55 plus age categories. We also include income category indicators. to November 6, 2016. We remove respondents who do not answer the presidential approval question from the sample before calculating these proportions. Figure C .1 reports the full set of bounds for all weekly polls in the Gallup Analytics database.
We also investigate the robustness of our bounding results to using a broader range of 
